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Capitol Hill used to be referred to as “the last plantation.”1  For the pur-
poses of this symposium, however, I believe that it is more useful to think of
Capitol Hill not in terms of the antebellum South but rather in terms of medie-
val Europe.  Congress consists of a series of fiefdoms.  To understand any par-
ticular lawyer’s role in Congress, it is important to know which fiefdom the
lawyer is part of, and who is its head.2
This essay is an attempt to sketch out in a preliminary way the work of sev-
eral different types of legislative lawyers.3  It suggests that the role of lawyers
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1. “Capitol Hill came to be known as ‘the last plantation,’ as Sen. John Glenn (D-Ohio) charac-
terized it as long ago as 1978,” because Congress would routinely exempt itself from the employment
and other laws that it enacted for the rest of the country.  Helen Dewar, Senate Joins in Lifting Hill’s
Worker Law Exemptions, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 1995, at A1.  This reputation is probably no longer de-
served, for in early 1995, Congress imposed on itself for the first time antidiscrimination, safety, and
other workplace laws through passage of the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-1,
109 Stat. 3 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1438 (Supp. II. 1996)).
2. See Christine DeGregorio, Professionals in the U.S. Congress: An Analysis of Working Styles,
13 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 458, 462 (1988) (“Knowing the extent to which aides work for one patron or many
patrons tells us something about the distribution of power among elected officials within Congress.”).
3. This article is an attempt to describe the reality of lawyer-client relations that I observed in the
Senate, rather than an attempt to proscribe what those relations ought to be like.  Compare Keith W.
Donahoe, Note, The Model Rules and the Government Lawyer, A Sword or Shield?  A Response to the
D.C. Bar Special Committee on Government Lawyers and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 2
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 987 (1989) (arguing that government lawyers ought to view their role as pur-
suing the public interest), with Roger C. Cramton, The Lawyer as Whistleblower: Confidentiality and
the Government Lawyer, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 291, 299 (1991) (“[T]he public interest approach
invites each government lawyer to analyze and define the public interest, a task tha[t] no individual
lawyer can hope to perform on his own.”); William Josephson & Russell Pearce, To Whom Does the
Government Lawyer Owe the Duty of Loyalty When Clients Are in Conflict?, 29 HOW. L.J. 539 (1986)
(criticizing the public interest approach as a way for government lawyers to resolve conflicts between
clients and concluding that “[s]uch a lawyer is not a lawyer representing a client but a lawyer repre-
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who work for individual legislators may actually be quite similar to that of cer-
tain lawyers in the Executive Branch.  The essay also examines the moral
choices faced by legislative lawyers, and the degree to which their professional
roles may insulate them from moral responsibility for the consequences
wrought by the legislation on which they work.  It is based primarily on my own
experiences and observations as a lawyer on Capitol Hill as well as my conver-
sations with other congressional lawyers.4
II
THE STRUCTURE OF AUTHORITY FOR SENATE STAFF
When I tell people that I used to work at the Senate Judiciary Committee,
most of them respond with the following question: “Did you work for the
Committee itself, or for a particular Senator?”  To the uninitiated, that may
seem like a reasonable question,5 but it displays how little the questioner knows
about the Committee.  Those more familiar with its workings would know that,
for the purposes of identifying the employer of a staff lawyer, there is essen-
tially no such thing as “the Senate Judiciary Committee itself.”
To explain this, it is perhaps best to start with a basic explanation of some
of the different types of lawyers who work in the Senate.  Some lawyers, such as
the Senate Legal Counsel, who represents the Senate in court proceedings,
work for the Senate as a whole.6  At first blush, this might seem like an impos-
sibly difficult arrangement.  Who, after all, can speak for the Senate as a
                                                          
senting herself.”); Jennifer Wang, Note, Raising the Stakes at the White House: Legal and Ethical Du-
ties of the White House Counsel, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 115, 121-23 (1994).
4. I worked as a lawyer at the Senate Judiciary Committee from 1991 to 1993.  This was an event-
ful time for the Committee, including multiple attempts to pass an omnibus crime bill that included
more than 50 new death penalty provisions, the notorious hearings on Clarence Thomas’s nomination
to the Supreme Court and Anita Hill’s allegations against Thomas, and the confirmation hearings of
two successful Attorney General nominees (William Barr and Janet Reno) and one also-ran (Zoë
Baird).  I was primarily responsible for dealing with issues of white collar crime, including the sen-
tencing guidelines for organizations, the federal government’s booming forfeiture program, and health
care fraud, but I also assisted in the Committee’s major nomination and oversight hearings.
The exact parameters of a former government lawyer’s continuing duty of confidentiality are by no
means clear.  Compare Richard W. Painter, A Law Clerk Betrays the Supreme Court, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 13, 1998, at A23, with Edward Lazarus, The Supreme Court Must Bear Scrutiny, WASH. POST,
July 6, 1998, at A19; see also Rita M. Glavin, Note, Prosecutors Who Disclose Prosecutorial Informa-
tion for Literary or Media Purposes: What About the Duty of Confidentiality?, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
1809 (1995).  It is at least arguable that the portions of this essay based on my own experiences are
subject to the duty of confidentiality.  I therefore sought and obtained consent for publication from my
former client, the former Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, through his administrative as-
sistant.
5. In fact, Congress seems to foster this misunderstanding by listing the names of Committee staff
generically in phone directories and committee reports, without any indication with which Senator
each staff member is associated.  But see REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES INVES-
TIGATING THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, H.R. REP. No. 100-433, app. B, vol. 4, at xi (identifying par-
ticular associate staff of the Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran with
specific Committee members).
6. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 288-288n (1994); Rebecca Mae Salokar, Legal Counsel for Congress: Protecting
Institutional Interests, 20 CONGRESS & PRESIDENCY 131 (1993) (discussing the Office of Senate Legal
Counsel and the General Counsel in the House of Representatives).
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whole?7  Fortunately, the statute that created the Office of Senate Legal Coun-
sel also defines precisely when the Legal Counsel may act on behalf of the Sen-
ate, requiring a vote of the Senate as a whole, the Legal Counsel’s bipartisan
advisory committee, or the relevant committee.8  Another high-profile example
of a lawyer working for the Senate as a whole was Peter Fleming, the Tempo-
rary Special Independent Counsel who was appointed to investigate leaks in
connection with the Keating Five investigation and the Anita Hill/Clarence
Thomas hearings.9  A Senate Resolution authorized the appointment of a law-
yer to conduct the leak investigation, but explicitly constrained his ability to
contest witnesses’ privilege claims.10  The Rules Committee Chair and Ranking
Member vetoed Fleming’s request to seek a court order for journalists to testify
about the sources of their information.11  Ultimately, those constraints pre-
vented Fleming from completing the investigation to his satisfaction.12  As these
two examples show, when the Senate seeks legal representation as an institu-
tion, it well understands its need to maintain control of that representation
through decisionmaking by Senators, rather than deferring to the judgment of
its lawyers.13
Other lawyers make their services generally available to any Senator, in
much the way that the Congressional Research Service makes its services avail-
able to all Members of Congress.14  For example, the Office of the Legislative
                                                          
7. There is a vast literature about the difficulties involved in representing an entity, such as a
corporation.  See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, Professional Responsibility and the Close Corporation:
Toward a Realistic Ethic, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 466 (1989); Nancy J. Moore, Expanding Duties of At-
torneys to “Non-clients”: Reconceptualizing the Attorney-Client Relationship in Entity Representation
and Other Inherently Ambiguous Situations, 45 S.C. L. REV. 659 (1994).
8. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1877, §§ 702, 703 (codified at 2
U.S.C. §§ 288a, 288b (1994)).
9. See S. DOC. 102-20, Pt. 1 (1992).
10. See S. Res. 202, 102d Cong. (1991).  The resolution authorizing this special appointment also
ensured that the Rules Committee or the Senate as a whole, rather than the Temporary Special Inde-
pendent Counsel himself, would decide whether to accept any witness’s claim that a privilege ex-
empted them from testifying.  See id. §§ 6(d), (e).
11. See S. DOC. 102-20, Pt. 2, at 22 (1992).
12. See S. DOC. 102-20, Pt. 1, at 78-80 (1992).  Fleming concluded his report as follows:
[T]here exists a tension between a journalist’s choice of silence and the rule of law which gov-
erns all citizens.  This tension cannot and should not be eased or resolved by accommoda-
tion. . . .   Senate . . . acquiescence in the media’s claim of a superior right . . . will sanction the
continued ability . . . of senators and staff persons to disclose confidential information with a
certainty that their anonymity will be secure. . . .  [W]hen we consider the needs of this insti-
tution, it is difficult to find a policy consideration which can justify anonymity. . . .
Id. at 79-80.
13. In many other contexts, lawyers may assume their clients’ right to make significant decisions
about the representation.  See DOUGLAS ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO’S IN CHARGE
(1974), cf. AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.2 cmt.
[hereinafter ABA Model Rule(s)] (“The client has ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be
served by legal representation . . .”).
14. See 2 U.S.C. § 166(d) (1994) (“It shall be the duty of the Congressional Research Service,
without partisan bias, . . . to prepare and provide information, research, and reference materials and
services to committees and Members of the Senate and House of Representatives . . . to assist them in
their legislative and representative functions.”) (emphasis added).  A manual for new Congressional
Research Service employees states:  “We work equally for all Congressmen and Senators, their staff,
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Counsel provides technical advice on the drafting of legislation to “any com-
mittee of the Senate.”15  Thus, before advising the chairman of the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee to introduce a particular bill, I consulted a lawyer in the Of-
fice of Legislative Counsel to ensure that the bill was drafted properly and that
it would be referred back to the Judiciary Committee.16  Legislative Counsel
lawyers provide advice to Senators’ staff, who may in some cases reject that ad-
vice.  Some of their proposed revisions may be insufficiently sensitive to politi-
cal issues.  For example, they may propose the clarification of language that the
Senator prefers to remain ambiguous.17  One finds in the Office of Legislative
Counsel the kind of professionalism and attention to detail and consistency de-
scribed by one commentator as necessary for careful legislative drafting.18
These lawyers seem to be both nonpartisan and nonpolitical.  They seem to see
themselves more as technicians than as political operators.19
At times, the Senate Legal Counsel plays this kind of role as well, such as
when it advises a committee on its investigative powers.20  For example, when
the Senate Judiciary Committee was holding its hearings on Anita Hill’s allega-
tions against Clarence Thomas, the Senate Legal Counsel himself was either
sitting directly behind the Chairman or waiting in the anteroom in the event
that any questions arose about the legality of the Committee’s subpoenas.21
A third category of legislative lawyer works for a particular Senator.  I refer
to this third type as a “political lawyer” because she owes her loyalty and her
job to an individual senator, and must be particularly sensitive to that Senator’s
                                                          
and committee staff and all must have confidence that when you assist them, you do so with your
knowledge of your field, not from your convictions of ‘what ought to be done.’”  C. GOODRUM, YOUR
WORK IN THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE: AN INTRODUCTORY OPERATING MANUAL 5-6
(1977) (emphasis in original) (quoted in Keeffe v. Library of Congress, 777 F.2d 1573, 1580 (D.C. Cir.
1985)).
15. 2 U.S.C. § 275 (1994).
16. It is important that the bill be referred back to the Judiciary Committee so that the Chairman-
sponsor could ensure that the bill would progress out of Committee, from arranging for a hearing on
the bill to seeing it through a mark-up session.  See David A. Marcello, The Ethics and Politics of Leg-
islative Drafting, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2437, 2451-52 (1996).
17. For a discussion of Congress’s deliberate ambiguity in drafting the 1991 Civil Rights Act, see,
e.g., Michele A. Estrin, Note, Retroactive Application of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to Pending Cases,
90 MICH. L. REV. 2035 (1992); Charles B. Hernicz, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: From Conciliation to
Litigation—How Congress Delegates Lawmaking to the Courts, 141 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1993).
18. See Roger Purdy, Professional Responsibility for Legislative Drafters: Suggested Guidelines and
Discussion of Ethics and Role Problems, 11 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 67 (1987).
19. Cf. DeGregorio, supra note 2, at 465 (identifying a subset of professional staff on Capitol Hill
who act as “technicians” and feel detached from policy outcomes).
20. One of the responsibilities of the Senate Legal Counsel is to advise investigative committees
regarding subpoena procedures.  See 2 U.S.C. § 288g(a) (1994) (“The Counsel shall advise, consult,
and cooperate with . . . any committee or subcommittee of the Senate in promulgating and revising
their rules and procedures for the use of congressional investigative powers with respect to questions
which may arise in the course of any investigation.”).  In so doing, the role is similar to that of the Sen-
ate Legislative Counsel: providing objective, technical advice to a particular constituency within the
Senate.
21. The Senate Legal Counsel also has the authority to bring a civil action to enforce a subpoena
when directed to do so by a Senate resolution.  See 2 U.S.C. § 288b(b) (1994).
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political goals and interests.22  These lawyers can be further divided into two
categories: those who work in the Senator’s “personal office,” and those who
work as part of his “committee staff.”23  Personal office staff tend to have re-
sponsibility for quite a wide range of issues, and therefore do not usually have
the opportunity to develop expertise in a particular subject area.24  Many, al-
though by no means all, Senate staffers are lawyers.  Except for lawyers in the
Office of the Senate Legal Counsel,25 there is no formal requirement that law-
yers working in the Senate actually be licensed to practice law.26  In fact, the
Chief Counsel of the Senate Judiciary Committee during the early 1990s had
never taken a bar exam.  Nevertheless, some Senate staff who are not lawyers
engage in lawyer-like work, such as drafting legislation.
In general, committee staff are hired by an individual Senator to handle his
work on a particular committee.  The size of a Senator’s committee staff de-
pends on the Senator’s seniority on the committee and on whether he is in the
majority or the minority party.  The longer the Senator’s tenure on the commit-
tee, the larger his budget.  Also, majority party Senators receive a larger budget
than those of the minority party.  Most committee staff tend to have less per-
sonal contact with the Senator, but have more of an opportunity to specialize in
a particular substantive area.  The Senate Judiciary Committee staff with whom
I worked—like personal office staff—acted as though they owed loyalty to the
particular Senator for whom they worked, rather than to “the Committee it-
self.”27  In the case of the Senate Judiciary Committee, staffers describe their
                                                          
22. It may be useful to contrast the situation of congressional lawyers with that of corporate law-
yers.  The standard legal analysis is that lawyers who work for corporations represent the corporation
itself rather than any of the individuals who run the corporation.  See infra notes 30-31 and accompa-
nying text (discussing ABA Model Rule 1.13) .
23. I use the male pronoun for Senators intentionally.  During most of my time on Capitol Hill,
there were no women members of the Senate Judiciary Committee.  In the wake of the 1991 hearings
on Anita Hill’s allegations against Clarence Thomas, and the 1992 elections that brought four addi-
tional women into the Senate, Senator Biden convinced two of the newly elected women, Diane Fein-
stein and Carol Mosely-Braun, to join the Committee.  See Hearings Before the Committee on the Judi-
ciary, United States Senate, on the Nomination of Zoë E. Baird of Connecticut to Be Attorney General of
the United States, 103d Cong. 1-2 (1993) (statement of Chairman Joseph Biden):
If confirmed Zoë E. Baird will be the first woman to serve the nation as Attorney General.
Moreover, her confirmation is being heard by a committee that welcomes its first two elected
women members, and I want to formally welcome the senator from California and the sena-
tor from Illinois.  You have no idea how happy I am you are voting on this panel
(Laughter/Applause).
24. See DeGregorio, supra note 2, at 462 (noting that committee staff are more involved in policy
formulation than are personal office staff).
25. See 2 U.S.C. § 288(a)(2) (1994).
26. Cf. 28 C.F.R. 50.14 (1998) (requiring that Justice Department lawyers be licensed by at least
one state or the District of Columbia).
27. Compare this description of how corporate managers experience their own work environ-
ments:
[Corporate m]anagers do not see or experience authority in any abstract way; instead,
authority is embodied in their personal relationships with their immediate bosses and in their
perceptions of similar links between other managers up and down the hierarchy.  When man-
agers describe their work to an outsider, they almost always first say: “I work for [Bill
James]” or “I report to [Harry Mills]” or “I’m in [Joe Bell’s] group,” and only then proceed
to describe their actual work functions.  Such a personalized statement of authority relation-
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work not in terms of their immediate bosses, but in terms of their ultimate
boss—the Senator for whom both they and their immediate bosses work.
III
THE IDENTITY OF A CAPITOL HILL LAWYER’S CLIENT
Surprisingly little has been written about the role of lawyers in the legisla-
tive branch.28  Lawyers in the Executive Branch have reflected much more
about their professional and institutional roles.  Fewer legislative branch law-
yers have gone into law teaching, as contrasted with the well-worn path from
the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel into legal academia.29  The
work culture of Capitol Hill is less reflective, and places more emphasis on
pragmatic concerns.  For whatever reason, there is not yet a well-developed
theory on the ethics of legislative lawyering.
If a legislative lawyer looked to the American Bar Association’s Model
Rules of Professional Conduct for guidance, she could be led very badly astray.
For example, an official comment to Model Rule 1.13 states that a government
lawyer’s client “is generally the government as a whole,” although in some cir-
cumstances the client may be a specific agency.30  Under this analysis, a lawyer
working for the Senate Judiciary Committee could have several possible clients:
the federal government “as a whole,” the legislative branch of government, the
Senate as an institution, or the Senate Judiciary Committee itself.  As a matter
of practice, however, none of these is the lawyer’s actual client.  Instead, the
                                                          
ships . . . exactly reflects the way authority is structured, exercised, and experienced in corpo-
rate hierarchies.
ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS 17 (1988) (citations
omitted).
28. See Steven Pressman, Ethics Rules Urged for Attorneys on Capitol Hill Staffs—Lack of Guid-
ance Seen, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 3, 1982, at 1; Marcello, supra note 16; Purdy, supra note 18.  A few
commentators have addressed issues faced by lawyers who act as legislators rather than legislative
staff.  See Dennis Mitchell Henry, Note, Lawyer-Legislator Conflicts of Interest, 17 J. LEGAL PROF. 261
(1992); Thomas M. Kellenberg, When Lawyers Become Legislators: An Essay and a Proposal, 76
MARQ. L. REV. 343 (1993).  By contrast, there is a much richer political science literature about the
activities of congressional staff.  See, e.g., HARRISON W. FOX, JR. & SUSAN WEBB HAMMOND,
CONGRESSIONAL STAFFS: THE INVISIBLE FORCE IN AMERICAN LAWMAKING (1977); MICHAEL J.
MALBIN, UNELECTED REPRESENTATIVES: CONGRESSIONAL STAFF AND THE FUTURE OF REP-
RESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1980); Christine DeGregorio, Professional Committee Staff as Policy-
making Partners in the U.S. Congress, 21 CONGRESS & PRESIDENCY 49 (1994); DeGregorio, supra
note 2; Susan Webb Hammond, Recent Research on Legislative Staffs, 21 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 543 (1996)
(reviewing academic literature since 1983).
29. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Protecting the Office of Legal Counsel from Itself, 15 CARDOZO
L. REV. 513 (1993) (referring to Cardozo Law School’s symposium, Executive Branch Interpretation of
Law, as a “symposium of Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) alumni”).  Eight of the 13 academics par-
ticipating in that symposium were OLC alumni.   See John O. McGinnis, Introduction, 15 CARDOZO L.
REV. 21 (1993) (listing the contributors); see also THE AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 1997-98
(listing faculty biographies).
30. ABA MODEL RULE 1.13.  Cf. D.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.3 cmt.
(“Because the government agency that employs the government lawyer is the lawyer’s client, the law-
yer represents the agency acting through its duly authorized constituents.”).
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Judiciary Committee lawyer has as her client a specific Member of Congress to
whom she owes her job and her professional loyalty.31
The typical political lawyer on Capitol Hill does not see her role as the
promotion of the public interest, except as her client/legislator defines for him-
self the public interest.32  There are limits to the kind of activities a political
lawyer can engage in, just as there are limits to what any lawyer in private prac-
tice can do.  It would be improper for a political lawyer to work on a legislator’s
purely personal legal problems, such as estate planning.33  Nor can the lawyer
engage in the legislator’s campaign work—at least not on government time—or
assist a legislator in illegal activity.34  Beyond that, political lawyers act as
                                                          
31. Some committees operate in a different way.  In other committees, lawyers who are hired by
the Chairman are supposed to provide advice to other members, including subcommittee chairs and
even members from the minority party.  The conflicts of loyalty that these lawyers face are daunting,
as discussed in Michael J. Glennon, Who’s the Client? Legislative Lawyering Through the Rear-View
Mirror, 61 LAW & CONT. PROB. 21 (Spring 1998).  See also David E. Price, Professionals and Entre-
preneurs: Staff Orientations and Policy-Making on Three Senate Committees, 33 J. POLITICS 316, 335
(1971) (“[T]he ‘professional,’ . . . saw himself as contributing to the legislative acumen of all committee
members, though he considered it his particular responsibility to give the chairman expert guidance.”);
Rules of Procedure, Senate Ethics Committee, Rule 16 (indicating that Ethics Committee staff “shall
perform all official duties in a nonpartisan manner” and that the appointment of all staff must be ap-
proved by both the majority-party Chairman and the minority-party Vice Chairman of the Ethics
Committee).
Similarly in the corporate context, while a lawyer may owe her job to a particular corporate officer
or employee, she owes her professional loyalty to the corporation as an entity.  See MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(a) (“A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents
the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.”) (emphasis added).  For an interest-
ing argument that the Model Rules conception of entity representation should not be applied to execu-
tive branch lawyers, see Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers’ Ethics in a System of Checks and
Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1293 (1987).
32. See DeGregorio, supra note 2, at 465 (“The aide does not advance a personal agenda that un-
dermines or conflicts with those of the legislators.  Rather, the staffer uses ingenuity and expertise to
search for initiatives that advance personal interests and at the same time serve the interests of the su-
periors.”).
33. See GREGORY S. WALDEN, ON BEST BEHAVIOR: THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND
ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT 274-77 (1996) (criticizing the Clintons for having Deputy White House
Counsel Vince Foster handle some of their personal legal matters, such as working to create a blind
trust for their assets, preparing their tax returns for 1992, and helping prepare the delinquent tax re-
turns for the Whitewater Development Corporation).
The line between personal and official work may be somewhat blurred.  Consider the example of a
Senator who spoke out against Zoë Baird’s failure to comply with the tax laws.  If, before speaking out,
the Senator asked a staff lawyer to check whether he himself had complied with those laws when he
hired household help, would that be considered purely personal?
34. See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) (“Whoever . . . aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures
[the] commission [of an offense against the United States] is punishable as a principal.”); ABA MODEL
RULE 1.2(d) (“A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the law-
yer knows is criminal or fraudulent. . .”).
While the Hatch Act does not apply to employees of the legislative branch, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 7324(a),
7322(1) (1994), the Senate has prohibited its employees from engaging in campaign activity while on
government time.  See SENATE SELECT COMM. ON ETHICS, SENATE ETHICS MANUAL 179-82 (1996),
S. DOC. NO. 104-25 (1996); Senate Select Comm. on Ethics, Interpretive Rulings No. 402 (Oct. 18,
1985) & No. 357 (Dec. 16, 1982), reprinted in INTERPRETATIVE RULINGS OF THE SELECT COMM. ON
ETHICS 194-95, 239-40 (1993).  On the other hand, it may not always be clear where the line is between
political activity that is appropriate for the government-paid staff of an elected official and campaign a
ctivity that is inappropriate for such staff.  See Ronald M. Levin, Congressional Ethics and Constituent
Advocacy in an Age of Mistrust, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1, 89-92 (noting that the Senate Ethics Committee
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though they have no particular obligation to the committee, to the legislative
branch, to the Senate, to the United States, and certainly not to the public in
general.
For example, in the spring of 1992, when the Chief Counsel for the Senate
Judiciary Committee asked me to draft legislation addressing health care fraud,
he did so only after reviewing the results of an opinion poll indicating that a
majority of Americans believed that a good way of ameliorating the high cost
of health care would be to increase the penalties for doctors who commit
fraud.35  I do not know whether he believed that increased penalties would de-
ter crime or benefit the public.  But I suspect he saw this as an opportunity to
increase the profile of the Chairman in the area of health care, which at the
time was a key issue in the presidential election campaign.  Such a bill would
also reinforce the Chairman’s reputation for being “tough on crime.”
The lawyers and other staff who worked for the Chairman of the Judiciary
Committee acted as though they owed loyalty to him rather than to any other
member of the Committee.  They were hired by him or by his Chief Counsel.
There was close coordination between his Committee staff and his personal of-
fice staff for priority setting and scheduling.  In thinking about policy initia-
tives, the committee lawyers and other staff kept in mind the Chairman’s past
positions on issues and how new policy stands would fit in with his future politi-
cal campaigns.  When meeting with interest groups, it was clear that staffers
represented the Chairman.  Our personal views on the issues were irrelevant.
Our role, like the role of an advocate in a courtroom or elsewhere, was to ex-
plain and defend the Chairman’s positions.
The Chairman’s political lawyers would work on behalf of another Senator
only at the direction of the Chairman himself.  This particular Chairman was
well-known for his cooperative relationships with other members of the Com-
mittee, even members from the opposing party.  So when a minority member
                                                          
found no impropriety occurred when a member of Senator Frank Lautenberg’s congressional staff
wrote memos to his campaign fundraising staff, “mention[ing] several individuals for whom the senator
had recently done favors and urg[ing] the fundraisers to invite these individuals to make contributions
to the senator’s reelection campaign.”).
35. On the question “[g]iven the high cost of health care insurance, which of the following steps
would you favor in order to reduce costs,” the results were as follows:
Favor Oppose Not
Sure
Limiting the awards of malpractice suits 73% 20% 7%
Setting limits on physician fees 83% 14% 3%
Fining or imprisoning physicians and other health care
professionals who commit fraud
90%   7% 3%
Surcharges for smokers and other high risk individuals who
engage in high risk behavior
57% 37% 6%
Limiting the amount spent on the terminally ill 28% 65% 7%
Limiting coverage on the elderly 13% 84% 3%
Telephone survey of 1000 adults conducted by Yankelovich Clancy Shulman, Aug. 27-28, 1991, re-
leased Dec. 11, 1991, sponsored by Time & CNN (available on WESTLAW, POLL database, Question
ID: USYANKCS.AUG91 R12A-G).
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was facing a tough reelection battle and wanted to hold field hearings in several
locations within his state, the Chairman authorized the hearings, and I attended
the hearings as the Chairman’s representative.  (The minority-party Senator
was the only member present at these hearings, and the full Committee did not
pursue further action on this Senator’s legislative proposal.)
Thus, in the legislative branch, the political lawyer’s role is to promote the
substantive agenda of the elected official, protect his political interests, and
make him look good.  Is this an accurate description of the work of any lawyers
in the Executive Branch?  It seems to me that it may well describe the work of
the White House Counsel.
Much has been written about lawyering for the President—certainly much
more than has been written about lawyering for a legislator.36  Former White
House Counsel Bernard Nussbaum was accused of making the mistake of
thinking that his client was President Clinton rather than “the office of the
President.”37  But it is not entirely clear how “representing the office of the
President” would differ from “representing the President.”  Under either for-
mulation, the lawyer faces the same kinds of limitations faced by lawyers in pri-
vate practice.38  She must not assist the client in wrongdoing.  In other words,
John Dean’s mistake was not that he thought that President Nixon was his cli-
ent; his mistake was assisting his client in obstructing justice.
Perhaps representing the office of the President implies some requirement
to balance a particular President’s personal political desires against the long-
term interests of the institution.39  But it is unclear why an unelected lawyer
rather than the elected official for whom the lawyer works should make such a
decision.40
                                                          
36. For a description of how the White House Counsel’s office has changed over time, see Jeremy
Rabkin, At the President’s Side: The Role of the White House Counsel in Constitutional Policy, 56 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 65-71 (Autumn 1993).  See also Nelson Lund, Lawyers and the Defense of the
Presidency, 1995 BYU L. REV. 17; Jeremy Rabkin, White House Lawyering: Law, Ethics, and Political
Judgments, in GOVERNMENT LAWYERS: THE FEDERAL LEGAL BUREAUCRACY AND PRESIDENTIAL
POLITICS 107 (Cornell W. Clayton ed., 1995); Michael Strine, Counsels to the President: The Rise of
Organizational Competition, in GOVERNMENT LAWYERS, supra, at 257; Wang, supra note 3.
37. See Jackson R. Sharman III, The White House’s “Personal” Lawyers, WASH. POST, Jan. 17,
1996, at A17 (“[F]or a White House lawyer, the client is the office of the president. . . .  [T]he role of
the White House lawyer is not to save the president’s personal bacon but to protect the integrity of the
office.”).
38. See Lund, supra note 36, at 24-29.
39. See id.
40. See Miller, supra note 31; see also John K. Carlock, The Lawyer in Government, in LISTEN TO
LEADERS IN LAW 255, 268-69 (Albert Love & James Saxon Childers eds., 1963), quoted in Robert P.
Lawry, Who is the Client of the Federal Government Lawyer? An Analysis of the Wrong Question, 37
FED. B.J. 61, 69 (1978):
I do not believe that the ritual of becoming a member of the bar invests a government lawyer
with a power of life and death over the agency he serves.  The agency head takes his own oath
of office, and he is also subject to the inscrutable forces of public opinion. . . .  No lawyer is
wise enough to decide that his concept of legal principle can never give way to the course of
action which a responsible administrator, charged with a legal duty and clothed with a consti-
tutional responsibility, thinks is wise.
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On the other hand, most executive branch lawyers are not “political law-
yers” representing individual politicians.  Instead, they represent an institution,
whether that institution is an agency, the Executive Branch, or “the United
States,” as Justice Department lawyers proclaim when they go to court.41  It
may well be appropriate, then, that with this institutional representation comes
an independent obligation to do justice, an obligation apparently not recog-
nized by political lawyers.42
IV
THE MORALITY OF THE POLITICAL LAWYER’S ROLE
To what degree is a lawyer responsible for the actions that her client takes
with the lawyer’s assistance?  If the action is illegal, the lawyer can be held le-
gally responsible.43  Suppose, however, that the client’s action is legally permis-
sible but morally repugnant.44  In such a case, should the lawyer feel morally re-
sponsible or implicated because of her own participation in the client’s
wrongdoing?45
The dominant ideology of the American legal profession seems to answer
this question in the negative.  Professor Stephen Pepper described this ideology
as follows:
Once a lawyer has entered into the professional relationship with a client, the notion
is that conduct by the lawyer in service to the client is judged by a different moral
                                                          
41. These lawyers have statutory authority for their claim to represent the United States.  See 28
U.S.C. § 517 (1994) (“[A]ny officer of the Department of Justice . . . may be sent by the Attorney
General . . . to attend to the interests of the United States in a suit pending in a court of the United
States. . .”).  While a prosecutor’s client is the government, I have heard at least one former Assistant
U.S. Attorney explain that she preferred the prosecutor’s job to private practice because, in her words,
“It was great.  I didn’t have a client.”
For an interesting discussion of whether an Independent Counsel may make that same claim to
“represent the United States,” see John Q. Barrett, All or Nothing, or Maybe Cooperation: Attorney
General Power, Conduct, and Judgment in Relation to the Work of an Independent Counsel, 49
MERCER L. REV. 519, 521-23 (1998).
42. See Jack B. Weinstein, Some Ethical and Political Problems of a Government Attorney, 18 ME.
L. REV. 155, 169-72 (1966) (discussing several examples of a government attorney deciding to temper
the government’s negotiating or litigating position in order to promote justice).
43. For an example of a lawyer being held criminally liable, see United States v. Cueto, 151 F.3d
620 (7th Cir. 1998).  For an excellent overview of these issues, see GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ET AL.,
THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 65-74 (2d ed. 1994).  For an example of lawyers being held
civilly liable, see Notice of Charges filed by the Office of Thrift Supervision Against Kaye, Scholer,
Fierman, Hays & Handler, reprinted in REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS-
1993, at 734-78 (Stephen Gillers & Roy D. Simon, Jr., eds., 1994).
44. See Stephen Pepper, Access to What?, 2 J. INST. STUD. LEGAL ETHICS (forthcoming 1998)
(“Legal rights mark off an area of individual autonomy; how the individual uses that autonomy may or
may not be morally justifiable. . . .  A lawyer who enables a client to achieve or actualize her legal
rights—to act within that area of autonomy—does not necessarily enable a morally justifiable result.”).
45. Cf. William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1144-45
(1988) (The “premise that the legal enforceability or permissibility of a client’s claim or course of ac-
tion is an ethically sufficient reason for assisting the client . . . ignores important legal values competing
with those that favor client autonomy and ignores that decisions may be legally permissible and yet not
best vindicate relevant legal merits.”).
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standard than the same conduct by a layperson. . . .  As long as what lawyer and client
do is lawful, it is the client who is morally accountable, not the lawyer.
46
The ABA’s Model Rules themselves, which otherwise instruct lawyers about
when they can be held legally responsible, seem to assert that lawyers should
not be held morally responsible for their work on behalf of clients.47
The argument that a lawyer is “morally insulated” from responsibility for a
client’s wrongdoing is quite strong, and perhaps at its zenith, in the criminal de-
fense context.48  A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to put the
prosecution to its proof; otherwise, the presumption of innocence would be
meaningless.  Even apart from this constitutional rights-based argument, how-
ever, there are at least two other reasons that “moral insulation” is appropriate
in this context.  First, when representing a criminal defendant, a lawyer is as-
sured that the adverse party (the state) is present at the proceeding, is repre-
sented by counsel, and often has substantial resources to make its case.  It is
therefore reasonable for a criminal defense lawyer to have faith that the adver-
sary system itself will ensure that justice will be done.49  Second, a criminal de-
fense lawyer’s work is retrospective rather than prospective in nature.  The
lawyer is attempting to defend the client against a charge of past wrongdoing.
No matter how horrible the client’s past actions, a lawyer’s defense of the client
does not directly assist a client in causing any future harm to others.50  Thus, it
                                                          
46. Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Pos-
sibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 614.  The opposite view has been described by Professor
Geoffrey Hazard:
[T]he probity of a lawyer can be deduced from the conduct of his clients.  If the client has en-
gaged in misconduct, his lawyer is prima facie guilty also, either because his advice was fol-
lowed but was morally insufficient, or because his advice was not followed and he has shown
himself willing to continue in the service of a morally deficient master.
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 143 (1978).
47. See ABA MODEL RULE 1.2(b) (“A lawyer’s representation of a client . . . does not constitute
an endorsement of the client’s political, economic, social or moral views or activities.”).  See also
HAZARD, supra note 46, at 136 (referring to “the professional dogma that the client’s conduct is never
morally imputable to his legal adviser”).
48. What I refer to as “moral insulation” has also been called “nonaccountability,” DAVID
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 52 (1988), and “independence,” Richard W.
Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate Lawyers and Their Clients, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 507
(1994).  See also the related literature on “role-differentiated morality,” for example, ALAN H.
GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 1-7 (1980); Richard Wasserstrom,
Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 3 (1975).
For more extensive arguments regarding the special position of criminal defense lawyers, see
David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729 (1993); William H. Simon,
The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1703 (1993); William H. Simon, Reply: Further Re-
flections on Libertarian Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1767 (1993).
49. See Simon, supra note 45, at 1097-98 (“[T]he more reliable the relevant procedures and institu-
tions, the less direct responsibility the lawyer need assume for the substantive justice of the resolution;
the less reliable the procedures and institutions, the more direct responsibility she need assume for
substantive justice.”); cf. Weinstein, supra note 42, at 169 (“The private lawyer can, within broad lim-
its, attempt to get the best possible result—from his single client’s point of view—letting the adversary
system provide justice.  What, however, of the public attorney?”).
50. The distinction between criminal defense lawyers and other lawyers may be more one of de-
gree than dichotomy.  For example, a public defender who wins acquittal for a client who has repeat-
edly beaten his wife might in some sense feel responsible if that client continues his violence after ac-
quittal.  That lawyer is not actually assisting the client in his harmful conduct, but is helping to make
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would be unfair to tar Michael Tigar with moral responsibility for the deaths
and suffering caused by his clients, such as Terry Nichols and John Demjan-
juk.51
But is this “moral insulation” equally appropriate where the lawyer is as-
sisting a client outside the adversary process in actions that will have effect in
the future?  When I worked on Capitol Hill, I felt torn by concern about the
consequences of my actions, such as assisting in the negotiation of a conference
report on an omnibus crime bill that would create more than fifty new death
penalty provisions.52  In fact, it appears that the drafters of the Democratic
crime bill deliberately crafted many narrow death penalty provisions rather
than a few broad provisions.  It may have been their goal to give the appear-
ance of greatly expanding the federal death penalty while only moderately ex-
panding the number of potential defendants who would be subject to it.53  My
role in this process was peripheral, and a filibuster prevented the bill from be-
coming law.54  After I left Capitol Hill, a later crime bill, which contained sixty
death penalty provisions, was passed by the Congress and became law.55  Even
                                                          
that harmful conduct possible.  In a more extreme case, a criminal defense lawyer who is on retainer to
represent members of a drug cartel or an organized crime family who become criminal defendants may
actually be assisting the cartel or crime family to continue its harmful conduct.  See Jan Hoffman, At
the Office with Bruce Cutler; Even Mob Lawyers Get the Blues, N.Y. TIMES, April 7, 1993, at C1
(describing government’s recording of conversation where John “Gotti seemed to be ordering [his
lawyer] Mr. Cutler to tell a Gotti associate to take a contempt charge rather than appear before a
grand jury.  Mr. Cutler replied: ‘I understand.’  Five days later, the associate refused to testify.”).  See
also HAZARD, supra note 46, at 144 (“[I]t is one thing to represent a sometime murderer, quite an-
other to be on retainer to the Mafia.”).
51. See Monroe Freedman, Must You Be the Devil’s Advocate?, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 23, 1993, at
19; Michael E. Tigar, Setting the Record Straight on the Defense of John Demjanjuk, LEGAL TIMES,
Sept. 6, 1993, at 22; Morroe Freedman, The Morality of Lawyering, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 20, 1993, at
22.
52. The Senate-passed crime bill contained 51 new death penalty provisions—three more than
President Bush had proposed in his crime bill.  The conference report contained two additional death
penalty provisions that had been in the House-passed bill, for a total of 53.  For a discussion of death
penalty politics, see Helen Dewar, On Capitol Hill, Symbols Triumph; Substance Suffers Amid Frus-
trating Fiscal Pressures, Political Fears, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1991, at A1 (“[L]awmakers from both
parties boasted repeatedly [about the number of death penalty provisions in their crime bills] in what
Sen. Howard M. Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) described as a contest to show who is ‘the toughest kid on the
block.’”); Michael Isikoff, House Democrats Offer Crime Bill Emphasizing Prevention, WASH. POST,
July 26, 1991, at A6 (“‘It’s just a bidding war,’ said one [House] Democratic aide of the new death
penalty crimes included in the bill.  Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-
Del.) ‘had to have more than the president, so we had to have more than the Senate.’”)
53. See David Von Drehle, A Broader Federal Death Penalty: Prelude to Bloodbath or Paper Ti-
ger?, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 1991, at A29  (“The list of 53 crimes includes a variety of . . . hardly ever
prosecuted [] murder subspecies—such as murder in the course of destroying a maritime platform;
murder of a member of Congress, the Cabinet or the Supreme Court; murder during deprivation of
religious rights; murder by genocide; murder in the course of a skyjacking; murder of a horse, poultry,
egg-products, meat or nuclear regulatory inspector.”).
54. See 137 CONG. REC. 36128 (Nov. 27, 1991).  The crime bill was actually stopped by a stealth
filibuster rather than the kind rarely seen except for screenings of the Jimmy Stewart movie, MR.
SMITH GOES TO WASHINGTON (Columbia 1939).  For an excellent discussion of stealth filibusters, see
Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 200-09 (1997).
55. See Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994); 140 CONG. REC. 12427 (Aug. 24, 1994)
(statement of Sen. Biden).
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an opponent of the death penalty might have been able to justify support for
the legislation because it contained other laudable provisions.56
This kind of political compromise is a fundamental part of life in a legisla-
ture, if not of political life in any institution.  Thus, a person who opposes the
death penalty might dissent to its imposition in his role as justice on the Su-
preme Court, but in the role of Senator, that same person could reasonably
choose to vote for legislation that included the death penalty if he favored
other provisions.  A person who cannot make this kind of compromise might be
able to manage in a judicial position—particularly on a single-member court—
but would find quite uncomfortable life in a legislature, where accomplishing
some goals almost always requires compromising other goals or principles.57
Nonetheless, I am troubled by the death penalty, and was concerned about my
own participation in expanding its availability.  How would I feel years on when
I learned of a criminal defendant who had been executed under these provi-
sions?  Would I feel implicated in that death?
Are such moral second-thoughts appropriate for a lawyer?58  From what I
could discern, they are uncommon among the political lawyers on Capitol
Hill.59  It may be that most political lawyers agree with the policy goals of leg-
                                                          
56. See 137 CONG. REC. S9816 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1991) (statement of Sen. Chafee):
As my colleagues well know, I long have opposed the death penalty, and have stated my
opinion on capital punishment before this body many times. . . .  On this bill, I voted against
each and every death penalty amendment offered, and supported an amendment by my col-
league from Illinois [Sen. Simon] to substitute mandatory life imprisonment for the death
penalty.  To my mind, we in this body have begun to apply the death penalty to everything
except school truancy. . . .  But . . . a clear majority of the Senate has indicated by roll call
votes that they do not agree with my view.  This bill does contain other provisions that I feel
strongly—and positively—about: limitations on assault weapons, and a national five day
waiting period for the purchase of handguns. . . .  The law enforcement community wants
these gun provisions and have lobbied long and hard for them. . . .  They need our help and
we should give it.  I therefore will be supporting the overall omnibus crime bill.  As I have
said many times, I do not support the death penalty. . . .  But the Senate has spoken repeat-
edly, and it is clear I can do nothing—at least for now—to change its mind.  The assault
weapons ban and the waiting period are two provisions, however, that are major steps for-
ward and are worth saving.  For that reason, I will support this bill.
57. For a very interesting discussion touching on the role of principle in a politician’s life, see
ANDREW STARK, PUBLIC POSTURES, PRIVATE ARRANGEMENTS: CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN
AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 246 (forthcoming 1999) (“We will continually seek evidence that [a politi-
cian] is willing to sacrifice office, understood as [self-]interest, for his subjectively-constitutive princi-
ples; and that he is prepared to sacrifice his selfish interests or indulgences for office, understood as an
outlet for the official’s most subjectively-harbored beliefs or commitments.”).
58. See Bruce A. Green, The Role of Personal Values in Professional Decisionmaking, 11 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS, 19, 38 (1997) (“A lawyer who could not put aside personal beliefs that conflicted with
the client’s objectives would therefore have a conflict of interest that would foreclose undertaking or
continuing the representation.”).
59. Cf. Carlock, supra note 40 (long-time government lawyer commenting on the fact that he did
not spend much time on “the sort of introspection out of which” his essay on government lawyers’
ethics was actually produced).
Anyone considering working as a political lawyer, whether on Capitol Hill, in the Executive Branch
of the federal government, in a state or local government, or on a campaign, would be well-advised to
clarify for herself the identity of her client and consider these questions prior to accepting the job.  Es-
pecially where the client is an incumbent politician, she will likely have ample information about that
politician’s policy positions.
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islators they represent, or that they believe their work generally furthers the
public good even if it does some harm as well.60  Or it may be that they, perhaps
like most lawyers, feel that they are “morally insulated” from the client’s ac-
tions.
Political lawyers are in a more difficult position than at least some lawyers
in private practice because a greater portion of their work is morally charged.  I
have heard more than one lawyer explain that she prefers to work on private
commercial disputes where the only thing at stake is whether Corporation A or
Corporation B walks away from the dispute with a pile of money.  The outcome
of such commercial disputes is less morally salient than policy questions about
mandatory minimum sentences for drug crimes, abortion rights, and welfare
policy.  Political lawyers who see moral issues lurking in many if not all public
policy questions may find professional life on Wall Street much easier person-
ally than professional life on Capitol Hill, unless they substantially share the
moral and political views of the politician for whom they work.
On the one hand, political lawyers can take some solace in the reasoning of
Professor Geoffrey Miller that they are mere advisers to elected officials.61  It is
the elected officials who appropriately have the responsibility to determine
which policy choice to make.  Their legitimacy is derived not from the sound-
ness of their reasoning but from their status as elected representatives.
On the other hand, where a political lawyer disagrees with the policy choice
on moral grounds, should she defer her moral judgment to that of the elected
official?  Is the “moral insulation” approach adopted by so many lawyers in
private practice appropriate for political lawyers?  We need not look very far in
the history of this century to see how government officials can cause massive
harm.  Not every policy disagreement constitutes a moral disagreement.  Yet
where it does, I am troubled by the notion that political lawyers should hide
behind their deference to the elected representatives for whom they work.62
It may be instructive to keep in mind the example of the Manhattan Project
scientists, and the responsibility they felt after the U.S. government dropped
the atomic bombs that these scientists had created on civilians in Hiroshima
and Nagasaki.  Rather than defer to the president who made the ultimate deci-
sion to drop the bombs, or to the military commanders who carried out the
task, many of these physicists went through a wrenching, soul-searching experi-
ence regarding their own moral responsibility for the 100,000 deaths and the
many more serious injuries.  No one was claiming that these scientists were le-
                                                          
60. See DeGregorio, supra note 28, at 462.
61. See generally Miller, supra note 31.
62. Professor Robert Tuttle’s examination of the moral and legal obligations of attorneys who rep-
resent fiduciaries may provide useful guidance—at least where the political lawyer believes that her
government official-client is betraying the public trust.  See Robert W. Tuttle, The Fiduciary’s Fiduci-
ary: Legal Ethics in Fiduciary Representation, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 339; see also Geoffrey C. Hazard,
Triangular Lawyer Relationships: An Exploratory Analysis, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 15 (1987); Jef-
frey. N. Pennell, Representations Involving Fiduciary Entities: Who Is the Client?, 62 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1319 (1994).
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gally responsible for these deaths.  But the scientists on their own attempted to
explore their moral responsibility.63
Fortunately for all of us, lawyers do not design nuclear weapons.  The harm
caused by lawyers is not of the same order of magnitude as that caused by
weapons of mass destruction.  But lawyers can and do assist their clients in
causing harm.  Yet I have not heard much soul-searching by the practicing law-
yers whose legal work has caused harm, such as those whose work for Charles
Keating and others cost the public billions of dollars.64
IV
CONCLUSION
Unlike the physicists involved in the Manhattan Project, most lawyers have
yet to grapple significantly with their moral responsibility for the future conse-
quences of their actions.  This seems especially true for lawyers, such as those
working on Capitol Hill, who function outside the adversary system and con-
tribute to outcomes whose impact is largely prospective, rather than retrospec-
tive.  The varied descriptions of legislative lawyering contained in this sympo-
sium suggest that we need a broader and more rigorous empirical examination
of the behavior and attitudes of the different types of Capitol Hill lawyers.65
This symposium is a step in that direction.  I hope that it generates more atten-
tion to these ethical issues and more research on these empirical questions.
                                                          
63. Cf. Wasserstrom, supra note 48, at 4:
The dominant view, although it was not the unanimous one, in the scientific community was
that the role of the scientist was to expand the limits of human knowledge. . . .  And it was
simply no part of one’s role as a scientist to forego inquiry, or divert one’s scientific explora-
tions because of the fact that the fruits of the investigation could be or would be put to im-
proper, immoral, or even catastrophic uses.
64. The involvement of lawyers in the savings and loan crisis has prompted judges and academics
to think long and hard about the degree to which lawyers contributed to the harm.  See, e.g., Lincoln
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 905-06 (D.D.C. 1990) (Sporkin, J.) (“Where were these
professionals . . . when these clearly improper transactions were being consummated?  Why didn’t any
of them speak up or dissociate themselves from these transactions?”); Symposium, From the Trenches
and Towers: The Kaye Scholer Affair, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 243 (1998); Symposium, In the Matter
of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler: A Symposium on Government Regulation, Lawyers’ Eth-
ics, and the Rule of Law, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 977 (1993).
65. See Glennon, supra note 31; Charles Tiefer, The Senate and House Counsel Offices: Dilemmas
of Representing in Court the Institutional Congressional Client, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47
(Spring 1998); John C. Yoo, Lawyers in Congress, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Spring 1998).
